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Economic Partnership Agreements and WTO negotiations. A quantitative 
assessment of trade preference granting and erosion in the banana market. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Trade preferences for developing country exports are widely used, either under a multilateral 
umbrella, such as the GSP schemes, on a regional basis, such as the US African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) scheme, or bilaterally. The expected a priori effects of preferential 
trade agreements are well known; obstacles which may limit their effectiveness in practice are 
discussed, among the others, by Bureau, Disdier and Ramos (2007), Candau and Jean (2005), 
Gallezot and Bureau (2004), Manchin (2006) and Panagariya (2002).  A reduction of MFN 
tariffs as a result of multilateral negotiations would imply a reduction, or the vanishing, of 
existing trade preference margins. Applied MFN tariffs in agriculture are much higher than those 
for manufactured goods; this implies that both the value of existing preferences and potential 
losses associated to the reduction of MFN tariffs are in agriculture much more relevant than in 
other sectors (Alexandraki and Lankes 2004; Bouët, Bureau, Decreux and Jean 2005; Bouët, 
Fontagné and Jean 2006; Bureau, Disdier and Ramos 2007; Goodison 2007; Law, Piermartini 
and Richtering 2006; Lippoldt and Kowalski 2005; Tangermann 2002; Yamazaki 1996; Yang 
2005; Yu and Jensen 2005, Wainio and Gibson 2004). It has been already decided that the final 
agreement of the Doha Development Agenda round of WTO negotiations on agriculture, if any, 
will include provisions addressing the issue of preference erosion. 
  This paper focuses on trade preferences and preference erosion with reference to the 
banana market, possibly the single market where benefits from trade preferences and potential 
losses from preference erosion are larger (Alexandraki and Lankes 2004; Law, Piermartini and 
Richtering 2006; Yang 2005) and conflicts among the different interests involved more evident 
and vocal. 
  The European Union (EU) is the world’s largest importer of bananas and among the top 
20 largest producers. Domestic production covers around one sixth of domestic consumption,   3
with imports from MFN and preferred African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries covering 
two thirds and one sixth of the EU market, respectively. All major exporters of bananas are 
developing countries and in most of them bananas account for an important share of export 
revenue; for Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama this share was in 2006 
around 10 per cent. Historically the EU import regime for bananas has been a source of heated 
political confrontations, involving the conflicting interests of domestic producers and consumers, 
multinational firms that control a large share of international trade, holders of quota licences 
under the previous EU trade regimes, least developed country exporters, preferred developing 
country exporters and developing country exporters subject to MFN conditions (Anania 2006; 
Josling 2003; Read 2001; Tangermann 2003a and 2003b; Thagesen and Matthews 1997).  
On 1 January 2008  the EU implemented the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) it 
had negotiated with many ACP countries (EC 2007).
1 The EPA will progressively remove 
barriers to trade between the EU and several groups of ACP countries creating free trade areas 
which are expected to be compatible with WTO rules.
2 All agricultural goods from the ACP 
countries which have successfully concluded the negotiations are now allowed duty- and quota-
free access to the EU. Bananas, with sugar and rice (for which, however, the Agreements call for 
a progressive removal of EU market protection by 2010), have been indicated as the three single 
agricultural commodities where most of the export benefits of the EPA for ACP countries are to 
be gained.  
This paper focuses on the impact of the EPA and on the implications of the possible 
conclusion of WTO negotiations for bananas. It provides a quantitative assessment of the 
expected benefits for ACP banana exporters of the elimination, as a result of the EPA, of the EU 
preferential import quota for ACP banana exports in place until 2007 and of the reduction of 
these benefits as a result of the erosion of preferential margins deriving from the conclusion of 
                                                 
1   Actually these are “interim” agreements, with the exception of the one signed with the Caribbean CARIFORUM 
countries. 
2   A WTO waiver allowing the EU to grant ACP countries under the Cotonou Agreement unilateral trade 
preferences which discriminated against other developing countries expired at the end of 2007.   4
negotiations which are currently taking place at the WTO.  In particular, the paper will consider 
the effects of the preference erosion which would derive from the lowering of the tariff applied 
to EU MFN imports due either to the conclusion of the DDA round or, if this should not happen, 
to the successful conclusion of the negotiations involving the EU, on one side, and several MFN 
exporters and the U.S., on the other, to try to bring to an end the long standing so called 
“Bananas III” dispute at the WTO.
3 These negotiations overlap and are somehow interlinked 
with those for the creation of Free Trade Areas (FTAs) between the EU and the Andean 
Community and the Central American Free Trade Area, where bananas remain among the most 
sensitive issues. 
The results obtained suggest that the impact of the EPA on production and consumption of 
bananas in the EU will be limited, while benefits for ACP countries are definitely expected to be 
significant. However, the final agreement of the WTO DDA round (if any), or a conclusion of 
the negotiations between the EU and MFN exporters to put an end to the banana dispute, may 
bring an erosion of the preferential margins currently enjoyed by ACP countries of such an order 
of magnitude as to cancel out most of these benefits. The actual outcome will depend on the EU 
bound tariff for bananas which will be subject to the reduction commitments (will this be the one 
indicated in the Uruguay Round EU “schedules”, or the tariff introduced with the reform of the 
EU import regime for bananas in 2006?); on whether bananas will be included among “tropical 
products”; and, if this should be the case, on the provisions for “tropical products” contained in 
the final agreement. 
2.  The model 
The model used is an expanded and updated version of the one used in Anania (2006,  2008); the 
main improvements are: the data base referring to 2005 (in Anania (2006, 2008) it referred to 
                                                 
3   The dispute dates back to 1996. The most recent episodes of the dispute refer to complaints by Ecuador in 
November 2006 and the U.S. in June 2007 that the “tariff only” regime the EU had introduced on 1 January 2006 
did not comply with WTO rules. In both cases the panels concluded that the preferences granted by the EU to 
bananas originating in ACP countries were not compliant with its Most Favoured Nation obligations.   5
2002); the five EU banana producing member states being modelled individually; the modelling 
of the 2007 EU enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania.  
It is a single commodity, spatial, partial equilibrium, mathematical programming model 
(Takayama and Judge 1971); a “quasi-welfare” function (Samuelson 1952) is maximized subject 
to a set of constraints describing relevant demand and supply functions, price linkages (due, for 
example, to transportation costs and policy interventions) and policies which cannot be 
represented through an exogenously determined price wedge.  
The fact that the model is ”spatial” – i.e., it is solved for the trade flows between each 
ordered pair of countries – makes it particularly suitable for representing policies that apply 
different regimes to imports from different countries without having to make unrealistic 
assumptions. This holds for both the current and previous EU trade regimes for bananas, which 
include TRQs applied on imports originating in specific groups of countries and preferential 
tariffs.  
Spatial models have been used to analyse the banana market by Kersten (1995) and Spreen 
et al. (2004). More often, however, non-spatial models have been used (Arias et al., 2005; 
Borrell, 1997; Guyomard et al., 1999a, 1999b and 2006; Guyomard and Le Mouël, 2003; and 
Vanzetti et al., 2005). The inability of a non-spatial model to generate bilateral trade flows has 
often been bypassed by assuming a priori that the existing TRQs are either binding or not 
binding (Arias et al., 2005; Vanzetti et al., 2005; Guyomard et al., 1999a and 1999b). However, 
whether a quota is binding or not is an empirical question, which needs to be answered 
endogenously by the modelling exercise. In addition, non-spatial models cannot include the 
possibility of out-of-quota imports taking place subject to a tariff higher than that imposed on in-
quota imports. Finally, non-spatial models cannot consider the EBA initiative in the simulations 
of the current EU import regime. In Vanzetti et al. (2005), the limitations of non-spatial models 
in dealing with discriminatory trade policies are circumvented by assuming imperfect 
substitution between bananas produced in different countries (Armington, 1969), implying that   6
bananas are not a homogeneous good and that consumers are able to differentiate them by their 
country of origin.  
The model includes five sources of domestic supply within the EU,
4  fifteen exporting
5 and 
five importing countries/regions.
6  Import demand and export supply functions, as well as 
domestic supply functions in the EU, are assumed to be linear, or to be well approximated by 
linear functions in the portion relevant for the simulations conducted. Functions in the base year 
are obtained from observed imported, produced and exported quantities, observed import, 
production and export prices, and import demand, supply and export supply price elasticities at 
the equilibrium in each country/region (Table 1). The values of the elasticities used are 
exogenously determined and are based on those used elsewhere (Anania 2006; Arias et al. 2005; 
Guyomard, Laroche and Le Mouël 1999; Kersten 1995; Spreen et al. 2004; and Vanzetti et al. 
2005) (Table 1). The sources for the data used in the model are the FAOSTAT and COMTRADE 
databases, the World Bank and the European Commission.   
EU “compensatory aid” deficiency payments to domestic banana producers in France, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece in place in 2005 are modelled; “compensatory” and “supplementary 
aid” payments are subject to the financial stabilizer mechanism. Domestic support being based 
on deficiency payments implies that domestic banana production in the EU is in the base 2005 
model independent of the market price of bananas. 
The modelling of the EU-25 import regime in 2005 includes:  
(a) a 3,113,0000 t tariff rate import quota (TRQ), with in-quota imports subject to a 75 €/t tariff 
(ACP exports can enter this quota duty-free);  
(b) a 750,000 t TRQ allocated to duty-free imports from ACP countries only; 
(c) an out-of-quotas MFN import tariff of 680 €/t (380 €/t for imports from ACP countries).  
                                                 
4   France (Martinique and Guadalupe), Spain (Canary Islands), Portugal (Madeira and Azores), Greece (Crete) and 
Cyprus. Banana production in continental Portugal is negligible and has been ignored.  
5   Six ACP countries/regions (Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Belize and Suriname, other ACP net 
exporter non-LDC countries, and ACP net exporter LDC countries) and nine MFN countries/regions (Ecuador, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras, Brazil, Guatemala, other MFN net exporter non-LDC countries, and 
MFN net exporter LDC countries). 
6   EU15, EU10, Bulgaria and Romania, United States, Rest of the world net importers.    7
For Bulgaria and Romania, U.S. and the “Rest of the world net importers” the model 
includes the tariffs applied in 2005; these equal 19.1%, 0.5% and 18.9%, respectively.  
The calibration of the 2005 base model, presented in Table 1, appears satisfactory. The 
simple average percentage difference, in absolute value, between observed and predicted exports 
in 2005 is 2.4%; the analogous value for imports is 3.5%. If the exports- and imports-weighted 
per cent differences, in absolute value, are considered instead, the average differences become 
2.3% and 2.8%, respectively. 
In the 2005 base model solution both EU TRQs are filled; ACP exports to the EU-25 equal 
750,000 t, those by non-ACP countries equal 3,113,000 t  and no ACP exports to the EU occur 
under the quota open to MFN exporters. LDC total exports of bananas equal 71 thousand t. 
All simulations have been generated with reference to 2013, when the 2006 reform of the 
EU domestic policies for bananas is to be fully implemented in all countries
7 and it will be 
possible to assess the market effects of the adjustments in production decisions as a result of the 
changes in both the EU import and domestic policy regimes as well as the implications of a 
successful conclusion of the DDA round, should this be the case. 
  The 2013 base reference model has been obtained from the base 2005 one by modelling:  
(a) the 2007 enlargement of the EU-25 to Bulgaria and Romania;  
(b) the introduction on 1 January 2006 of the EU “tariff-only” import regime;  
(c) the implementation of the EBA initiative;
8  
(d) the 2006 reform of the EU Common Market Organization (CMO) for bananas; and 
(e) the changes in import demand and export supply functions in all countries/regions 
resulting from expected shifts in domestic demand and supply functions. 
The dollar/euro exchange rate in 2013 has been assumed to be equal to 1.5 (in the 2005 base 
model it was 1.2441).  
                                                 
7   In Cyprus the full implementation of the reform will take place in 2013.  
8   The implementation of the EBA initiative for bananas was completed in 2006.   8
The 2007 EU enlargement has been modelled by removing barriers to trade between 
Bulgaria and Romania and the EU-25 and by extending to them the EU import regime.  
Imports from MFN countries are now subject only to a 176 €/t tariff. ACP countries are 
granted preferential duty-free access within a 775,000 t TRQ while out-of-quota exports are 
subject to the 176 €/t MFN tariff. 
Banana exports from LDC countries enter the EU tariff-free and are not subject to any 
quantitative limitation. 
Import demand and export supply functions shift according to expected changes, ceteris 
paribus, in the quantities produced and consumed in each country/region.
9 Consumption is 
assumed to vary over time on the basis of observed changes in population and in per capita 
incomes between 2000 and 2005;
10 the values used for domestic demand income elasticities are 
provided in Table 1. Production in each country/region is assumed to change over time, ceteris 
paribus, in line with observed changes in banana yields between 1992-1995 and 2002-2005.
11  
The EU CMO for bananas in place until the end of 2006 provided generous and fully 
“coupled” support to domestic producers through a deficiency payment scheme; the per unit aid 
was given by the difference between a reference price, which did not change over time, and the 
observed domestic price. The December 2006 reform cancelled the CMO (EC 2006; Anania 
2008). For banana producing areas outside the “outermost regions” (Greece, Cyprus and 
continental Portugal) support  (€4.6 million) has been “decoupled” and included in the Single 
Farm Payment introduced by the June 2003 Fischler reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.  
For the “outermost regions” (France; Spain; Azores and Madeira in Portugal) financial resources 
of a similar order of magnitude to those previously absorbed by deficiency payments (€278.8 
million) have been added to the budget allocation of their POSEI programmes; these 
programmes finance the use of a wide range of policy instruments, whose aim is to increase the 
                                                 
9    The FAOSTAT data base is the source used for production and consumption data in 2005. 
10   In both cases the data source is World Bank (various years). 
11  The source is the FAOSTAT database.    9
competitiveness of agricultural production in these “disadvantaged” outermost regions. The 
decision on which policy instruments to implement is left to the individual member country. The 
reform is introduced in the model by removing the deficiency payments in place in 2005 and by 
modelling the policy instruments introduced in France, Spain and Portugal with their POSEI 
implementation decisions for 2007 (these have been confirmed, unchanged, for 2008):
  
(a)  in France the entire budget allocation (€129.1 million) is devoted to “decoupled” 
payments calculated for each farm on the base of bananas produced in a reference period. 
In order to receive the full entitlement of “decoupled” payments, farms have to produce 
at least 80% of  what they produced, on average, in the reference period (in total 255,267 
t); if production is between 70% and 80% of what it was in the reference period, the farm 
will receive 80% of its entitlement of decoupled payments; if it is below 70% it will 
receive the same percentage of the entitlement. However, it turns out that the financial 
incentive (around 11,600  €/ha) is large enough to ensure that farms find it profitable to 
produce the minimum volume of bananas needed to enable them to claim the full amount 
of “decoupled” payments;  
(b) in Spain the aid for open air banana production is assumed to be used to its maximum 
extent (7,600 ha; 9.1 million €) and the remaining budget allocation (€132 million) to be 
devoted to “decoupled” payments calculated on the base of bananas produced by each 
farm in a reference period. In order to receive their full entitlement of “decoupled” 
payments, farms have to produce at least 70% of  what they produced, on average, in the 
reference period (in total 294,000 t). In this case too it turns out that the financial 
incentive (decoupled payments are in this case around 11,800  €/ha) is large enough for 
farms to find it profitable to produce the minimum volume of bananas needed to be able 
to claim the entire amount of decoupled payments they are eligible for;  
(c) in Portugal the entire financial allocation is devoted to the introduction of a fully 
“coupled” fixed production subsidy. The amount of the per unit subsidy is given by the   10
financial allocation divided by the volume of banana production in Madeira and Azores 
used in the proposal for the POSEI programme for bananas put forward to the 
Commission by Portugal in 2007; this yields a subsidy equal to 455.2  €/t.
12 The subsidy 
expenditure cannot exceed Portugal’s financial allocation (€8.7 million); if production is 
such that expenditure would exceed the maximum allowed, the per unit subsidy is cut pro 
rata so that the expenditure equals the budget allocation. 
3.  Results of the simulations 
The results of the simulations are presented in Table 2.  
In the “Base 2013” reference scenario the EPA and the outcome, if any, of the multilateral 
and regional negotiations are ignored. As explained above, with respect to the “Base 2005” 
simulation this scenario includes the 2007 enlargement of the EU-25 to Bulgaria and Romania, 
the EU “tariff-only” import regime introduced on 1 January 2006, the EBA initiative, the 2006 
reform of the EU CMO for bananas, as well as changes in import demand and export supply 
functions as a result of expected changes in yields, population and per capita incomes. Despite 
the expected increase by 24 €/t of the domestic price of bananas, EU-27 consumption is forecast 
to expand between 2005 and 2013 by 360,000 t ; this is due to the combined effects on the EU 
demand for bananas of expected changes in per capita income and population (Table 1) and of 
the significantly stronger euro. Domestic production drops from 723,100 to 578,900 t as a result 
of the reform of the CMO for bananas. In France and Spain banana production is forecasted to 
equal the minimum threshold required for farms to claim the full amount of their entitlements of 
“decoupled” payments:
13  255 and 294 thousand t, respectively, vs. 309 and 384 thousand t 
produced in 2005 under the previous domestic policy regime. In Portugal, where support remains 
                                                 
12  The actual policy choice by Portugal is to introduce two different subsidies in Madeira and the Azores, equal to 
446 €/t and 600 €/t, respectively; however, the structure of the model does not allow us to consider banana 
production in the two outermost regions separately.  
13  The model does not include uncertainty and, as a result, ignores the effects of risk on producer decisions in 
France and Spain. If producers are risk averse, their ex ante production decisions will target an expected volume 
of production above the minimum required for them to collect the full amount of support they are entitled to; this 
means that, ex post, on average, producers will overshoot their minimum production target and the model 
underestimates the expected value of domestic production in the EU.     11
fully “coupled” (although under a different policy regime), production equals 23 thousand t, 
while it was 19 thousand t in 2005. EU-27 imports increase by 500 thousand t. In the other two 
importing regions imports are forecasted to move in opposite directions; they are expected to 
increase by 370 thousand t in the USA and to decline by 275 thousand t in the Rest of the World. 
Imports decline in the Rest of the World despite the robust increase in population and per capita 
incomes as a result of the larger sensitivity of domestic demand to the price increase and, more 
important, for the large expected increases in yields in domestic banana production (Table 1). 
The stronger euro is the main factor explaining the expansion of ACP exports; ACP countries 
export 33 thousand t out of the quota, subject to the 176 €/t MFN tariff; in the first two years 
after the introduction of the new EU import regime observed ACP out-of-quota exports subject 
to MFN conditions were 116,000 t in 2006 and 62,000 t in 2007. MFN exports to the EU are 
forecasted to increase between 2005 and 2013 by 490,000 t as a result of the change in the EU 
import regime, of the increase in the €/$ exchange rate and of changes over time in domestic 
demand and supply functions; total MFN exports are expected to increase by 600,000 t . LDC 
are forecasted to exit the world market for bananas (LDC exports were 71,000 t in 2005) as a 
result of the loss of competitiveness over time of their bananas vis a vis both ACP and MFN 
ones, despite the introduction by the EU of the EBA initiative.  
Seven policy scenarios are considered. All simulations are generated with respect to 2013 
and they all include the implementation of the EPA; for bananas this meant the removal on 
January 1 2008 of the quota on EU imports from ACP countries, which now occur duty- and 
quota-free. Differences in the seven policy scenarios relate to the assumptions made with respect 
to the conclusion of WTO negotiations and the consequent banana tariff reductions.  
The future of the DDA round remains unclear: will an agreement be reached? when will 
this occur? what will be the “ambition” of the final agreement? are all questions to which there 
is no easy answer. In the first two scenarios it is assumed that no DDA round agreement is 
reached. In the first it is assumed that on-going negotiations between the EU and MFN countries   12
to solve the current dispute in WTO also fail to achieve a mutually acceptable solution; hence, 
this scenario simulates the impact of the implementation of the EPA only. The second scenario 
assumes that, on the contrary, the EU and MFN countries reach a bilateral agreement that the 
current 176 €/t MFN tariff is replaced by a tariff equal to 110 €/t ; because there is no DDA 
agreement, the import tariffs imposed by the U.S. and the aggregation of all other net importing 
countries remain unchanged.  
In the first scenario, the one simulating the impact of the EPA everything else remaining 
unchanged, the EU market is only marginally effected; total imports and consumption increase 
and domestic production and price decline as a result of the increased preferential market access, 
but by a small amount in every case. Where the impact of the EPA is felt is in the composition of 
EU imports. The removal of the import quota leads to an increase of ACP exports to the EU by 
650 thousand t, while MFN exports to the EU decline by 620 thousand t . Imports and 
consumption in the other importing countries increase as a result of the expansion of the MFN 
export supply towards countries other than the EU because of the loss in relative competitiveness 
of MFN banana exports on this market; as a result, total MFN exports decline by 470 thousand t . 
Banana export revenue in ACP countries almost triples,
14 while it declines by 6.8% in MFN ones.  
In the second scenario, the lower EU MFN tariff makes EU imports and consumption 
increase and tariff revenue drop with respect to the two scenarios considered so far. When 
compared to the values in the first scenario, EU domestic price is lower by 11.8%, consumption 
and imports increase by 5.3% and 6%, respectively, and tariff revenue declines by 27.1% ; EU 
domestic production is only slightly effected by the policy change, as production in France and 
Spain remains unchanged (it equals the minimum required for farmers to collect their full 
entitlements of direct payments)
15 and only production in Greece, Portugal and Cyprus adjusts to 
the change in domestic price. The 110 €/t tariff remains short of “compensating” MFN countries 
                                                 
14  Export revenue for ACP countries in the “Base 2013” scenario does not include quota rents, which are assumed 
to be enjoyed by quota licence holders located outside the exporting country (importers in the EU or 
multinational trading firms).  
15 This is the case in all other scenarios as well.   13
for the loss of competitiveness of their exports on the EU market as a result of the EPA. In fact, 
if this second scenario is compared with the first one, MFN banana exports to the EU increase by 
almost 500 thousand t but remain below those in the “Base 2013” scenario; ACP exports to the 
EU decline by 230 thousand t, remaining well above those when the EPA are not in place. In 
order to allow for an assessment of the possible outcome of the negotiation between the EU and 
MFN exporters, in Figure 1 total EU imports and their composition by origin (ACP and MFN 
countries) are provided as a function of the agreed level of the EU MFN tariff; EU imports 
increase as the MFN tariff is reduced, MFN exports to the EU increase and those from ACP 
countries decline. The MFN tariff being equal to 176 €/t corresponds to scenario 1 in Table 2; if 
MFN countries are granted the same treatment as ACP ones (i.e. all EU imports of bananas occur 
duty- and quota-free), total EU imports reach 5.16 million t , MFN exports to the EU 4.318 
million t and ACP exports contract to 842 thousand t, a volume still above the one in the no-
EPA, no-agreement “Base 2013” scenario. The MFN tariff which would bring MFN exports to 
the EU back to their pre-EPA volume (3.605 million t) is equal to 94 €/t ; this tariff would yield 
EU imports (4.778 million t), and ACP exports (1.172 million t) well above their levels in the 
“Base 2013” scenario. 
The other five scenarios all assume that a DDA agreement is reached, the implementation 
period ends in 2013,
16 and bananas are not included by the EU among its “sensitive” products; 
the latter is mainly based (a) on unofficial information regarding developments in the 
negotiations on agriculture
17 and (b) on the presumption that it is unlikely that the EU will be 
willing to reintroduce import quotas for bananas. 
In the third and fourth scenarios it is assumed that bananas will eventually be excluded from 
the list of “tropical products”; the difference between these two scenarios is in the agreed level of 
the EU bound MFN tariff which is to be reduced. In the third scenario this is assumed to be the 
                                                 
16  This means assuming that an agreement is reached by the end of 2008, the implementation period starts in 2009 
and lasts five years (WTO 2008b), and ignoring differences in the length of the implementation period for 
developed and developing countries. 
17  Bridges weekly (ICTSD 2008) reported that MFN exporters had prevailed on preference-receiving countries in 
having bananas removed from “a potential list of sensitive products” to be designated by major importers.   14
final bound tariff indicated in the “schedules” contained in the 1994 Uruguay round Agreement 
on Agriculture (680 €/t) and that this is to be reduced by 66% (the ad valorem tariff equivalent 
exceeds 75% and the lowest value in the range indicated in WTO (2008a) for the per cent 
reduction to be applied in the uppermost of the four tiers foreseen is used.
18 The bound tariff 
obtained equals 231.2 €/t, which is higher than the applied tariff of 176 €/t; this means that in 
this case the agreement would leave the EU import regime unchanged, and only import tariffs 
applied by the other importing countries are reduced. The fourth scenario assumes that the 
current bound tariff is the one introduced by the EU on January 1 2006 (176 €/t) and that this is 
to be reduced by 55% (the ad valorem equivalent falls between 20% and 50% and, again, the 
lower value in the range indicated in WTO (2008a) for this tier is used); the result is a tariff 
applied by the EU in 2013 equal to 79.2 €/t . In both scenarios three and four the import tariffs 
applied by the U.S. and the aggregation of the other net importing countries are reduced by 48% 
(the lower bound of the range for the tariff reduction indicated in WTO (2008a) for the 0%-20% 
tier).
19 
In the third scenario the only difference with respect to the first are the changes in the 
import tariffs imposed by the U.S. and the “Rest of the world net importers” (these are reduced 
from 0.5% to 0.3% and from 18.9% to 9.8%, respectively). The market impact of these changes 
is relatively small; banana imports by the “Rest of the world net importing countries” increase by 
285 thousand t, while EU and U.S. imports slightly decline; for the U.S. this is due to the fact 
that the reduction in market protection by the Rest of the world overcomes the effect of lowering 
the (already low) protection of its own domestic market. Both MFN and ACP exports increase, 
although by relatively small volumes. When in scenario four the EU import tariff is also reduced 
- from 176 to 79.2 €/t - then the impact of the DDA agreement is more marked. When compared 
with those in the first scenario, EU consumption and imports increase by 370 and 375 thousand t; 
                                                 
18  This remained unchanged in the most recent revision of the draft modalities for agriculture (WTO 2008b).  
19  In WTO (2008b) the ranges for the possible tariff cuts in WTO (2008a) for the 0%-20% and 20%-50% tiers have 
been replaced by proposed tariff cuts of 50% and 57%, respectively, which are only slightly above those used 
here.   15
ACP countries lose competitiveness on the EU market and their exports decline by 325 thousand 
t, while MFN exports to the EU expand by 700 thousand t; total MFN exports increase by 798 
thousand t and imports by the U.S. and the other net importing countries decline by 79 thousand t 
and increase by 177, respectively. Export revenue declines in ACP countries by 37.5% and 
increases in MFN countries by 12%.  
In the final three scenarios bananas are assumed to be subject to the provisions, to be 
decided, for “tropical products”. What the interpretation in the final agreement will be of the 
“full liberalization of trade in tropical agricultural products” WTO member countries agreed in 
2004 (WTO 2004) remains to be seen; based on the July 2007 attempt by Crawford Falconer, the 
current Chair of the committee for the negotiations on agriculture in the DDA round, to 
summarize the status of the negotiations at that point (WTO 2007; para. 114, p. 18) two possible 
interpretations are considered here: (a) “full liberalization” to be translated in tariff- and quota-
free market access for “tropical products”, or (b) import tariff reductions for “tropical products” 
in each country to be set equal to the largest reduction applied in the same country to agricultural 
import tariffs. These alternatives possibly represent the boundaries for the decision to be taken in 
the final agreement regarding “tropical products”. Hence, the fifth scenario assumes tariffs on 
banana imports in 2013 to be all set equal to zero. The last two scenarios assume instead that all 
bound tariffs for bananas are reduced by 66% (the lowest value of the range of the per cent tariff 
reduction envisaged both in WTO (2008a) and WTO (2008b) for the uppermost tier); in the sixth 
scenario the EU bound tariff to be reduced is assumed to be 680 €/t; in the seventh to be 176 €/t. 
In the fifth scenario banana trade is fully liberalized. As a result, EU consumption and 
imports are the largest among all scenarios considered (they equal 5,693 and 5,123 thousand t, 
respectively). The same is true for MFN exports, both in total (13.3 million t) and to the EU (4.2 
million t). On the contrary, ACP countries experience a severe erosion of the preferential 
margins they enjoy under the EPA; ACP exports equal 873 thousand t, vs. 809 thousand t in the 
“Base 2013” scenario (the one with no EPA and no WTO agreement) and 1,459 thousand t in the   16
most favourable scenario (this is scenario one, when the EPA are in place and the EU MFN tariff 
remains unchanged at 176 €/t). Banana export revenue in ACP countries is now 15.1% higher 
than in the “Base 2013” scenario, but 61.4% lower than in the scenario where the EPA are 
implemented and no agreement comes out from WTO negotiations. 
The market equilibrium in the sixth scenario is very close to that obtained in the third one, 
as the EU applied tariff remains unchanged (176 €/t) and only the tariffs applied by the U.S. and 
the other net importing countries are further reduced, to 0.2% and 6.4%, respectively (in scenario 
three they are 0.3% and 9.8%). Finally, in the seventh scenario, when the EU applied tariff is 
reduced to 59.8 €/t, the results obtained are between those in scenarios four and five. EU imports 
equal 4.892 million t and MFN and ACP exports to the EU equal 3.821 and 1.072 million t, 
respectively. 
4.  Sensitivity analyses 
As is always the case, the results of a modelling exercise depend, at least to a certain extent, on 
the quality of the information used and on the assumptions made. The main issues to be aware of 
when considering the results of this study are: the quality of the data available; the assumption 
that all actors involved in banana trade – i.e. countries as well as multinationals involved in 
banana production and trade and large retail agglomerations – behave competitively; the 
assumption that bananas are a homogeneous product (which, among other things, means 
ignoring the growing importance of “Fair trade” and organic bananas); the assumption that 
banana producers in France and Spain are risk neutral, or are risk averse but operate under no 
uncertainty; the assumption that the supply of transportation services is infinitely elastic (i.e. 
banana trading is not constrained by transportation capacity, and transportation and other 
transaction costs do not vary either as a function of the volume traded or over time).  
In order to assess the robustness of the results obtained to some of the assumptions made 
regarding the parameters of the model, sensitivity analyses have been performed with respect to 
those which appear among those potentially more critical: (i) the €/$ exchange rate; (ii) the price   17
responsiveness of banana exports in ACP countries; and (iii) the extent of production increases 
over time due to technical changes. The sensitivity analyses have been conducted for all the 
scenarios considered in the previous section; they are intended to provide the reader with a sense 
of “to what extent” and “in which direction” the results presented above would change if 
different assumptions were made with respect to the parameters considered. 
In the simulations presented above the €/$ exchange rate in 2013 is assumed to be 1.5 (in 
the “Base 2005” model it was 1.2441); two alternative values have been considered to test the 
sensitivity of the results to this parameter: 1.7 and 1.3 . Changes in the exchange rate modify the 
competitiveness of EU imports vis a vis domestic production and effect the price of bananas in 
the EU market; a higher exchange rate increases the competitiveness of EU imports and lowers 
the price, while a lower exchange rate, on the contrary, makes imported bananas less competitive 
on the EU market and the price of bananas in the EU increase. When the results obtained (Tables 
3 and 4) are compared with those presented in Table 2, the differences appear relatively small. 
For example, in the two extreme policy scenarios - scenarios one (EPA only) and five (full 
liberalization) - when the €/$ exchange rate is 1.7 EU imports are larger by 3.9% and 3.6% and 
ACP and MFN exports to the EU by 6.5% and 1.0%, and by 2.7% and 4.1%, respectively; when 
the exchange rate is set equal 1.3 EU imports are lower by 5%, and 4.6%, and ACP and MFN 
exports to the EU by 6.6% and 1.2%, and by 1.3% and 5.3%, respectively. 
The sensitivity of the results obtained to the assumptions made with respect to the elasticity 
of the export supply functions in the ACP countries has been assessed by lowering those of Ivory 
Coast and Cameroon (these two countries alone account for almost 60% of ACP banana exports) 
from 1.5 to 1, to make their exports less price responsive (Table 5). The results obtained under 
all policy scenarios are relatively robust with respect to these changes; in scenarios one and five, 
for example, ACP exports to the EU are lower by 0.1% and higher by 5.4% , respectively. 
Finally, the sensitivity of the results presented in section 3 to the assumptions made 
regarding expected technical developments in banana production between 2005 and 2013 has   18
been assessed by imposing a 2% maximum constraint on yearly yield increases; this meant using 
for Cyprus, Ivory Coast, Dominican Republic, Other ACP non-LDC countries, and Guatemala, 
and, among the importers, in the Rest of the world, a per cent yearly yields increase lower than 
the one observed between 92-95 and 02-05.  In this case results appear to be sensitive to the 
assumptions made. Among the exporters the main impact is a significant reduction in the 
competitiveness of ACP banana exports vis a vis those from MFN countries (Table 6); the 
reduction in the rate of adoption of technical changes among the net importers aggregated in the 
“Rest of world” makes their import demand function expand significantly. In the two extreme 
policy scenarios considered, scenarios one and five, EU imports are lower with respect to those 
in the simulation presented in the previous section by 2.3% and higher by 3.6%, respectively, 
and Rest of the world imports are higher by 14.2% and 15.2%; ACP exports are lower in 
scenario one by 39.3% and in scenario five by 55.7%, while total MFN exports are higher by 
8.2% and 8.3%.  
5.  Conclusions 
The goal of this paper was twofold: to provide a quantitative assessment of the impact on the 
banana market (a) of the expansion in trade preferences the EU granted to ACP countries with 
the EPA and (b) of the erosion of these preferences implied by different possible endings, if any, 
of the DDA round or by the positive conclusion of current negotiations between the EU and 
MFN exporters to find a commonly acceptable solution allowing for the conclusion of the DDA 
round and putting an end to the “Banana III” WTO dispute. 
The results of the simulations performed suggest the EPA will have only a minor impact on 
the EU domestic market for bananas, while the impact on the composition of EU imports by 
origin will be significant. As a result of the EPA, ACP exports are forecast to increase by 80% 
(from 809 to 1,459 thousand t) at the expense of MFN exports, which decline by 3.8% (from 
12.3 to 11.8 million t; MFN exports to the EU decline by 17.1%). A reduction of the MFN tariff 
to 94 €/t would be needed, everything else held constant, to leave MFN exports unchanged with   19
respect to the situation without the implementation of the EPA (while ACP exports would 
remain well above the level with no EPA). 
A successful conclusion of the DDA round could have, at one extreme, no impact or, at the 
other extreme, a very significant one on the erosion of the preferences the EU grants to ACP 
countries, depending on what will be eventually agreed. If the EU bound tariff to be reduced is 
assumed to be equal to 680 €/t (as could be legitimately claimed by the EU) and bananas are 
either not included among “tropical products”, or are included and provisions for these products 
in the final agreement only call for a tariff reduction by the largest percentage applied to 
agricultural products in each country, then ACP countries would actually benefit from the 
agreement, although these benefits are forecast to be small; this is so because the EU applied 
tariff on MFN imports would not change while the other importers will have to lower their 
market protection and this would induce an increase in export prices worldwide and a 
contraction of the MFN export supply to the EU market. At the other extreme, if bananas are 
included among “tropical products” and the final agreement of the DDA round calls for the 
elimination of all import restrictions for these products, then most of the benefits to ACP 
countries from the EPA would vanish; in fact, ACP exports are now forecast to be higher than in 
the no-EPA scenario by a mere 6.5%, rather than by 80% when the EPA are in place and there is 
no agreement of any sort at the WTO. 
While these conclusions appear robust to changes in a number of the assumptions made, 
they  are relatively sensitive to the hypotheses made with respect to expected changes in yields. 
Because ACP exporters are less efficient in producing and marketing bananas than MFN ones, 
this suggests that aid targeted at improving efficiency in banana production in ACP and LDC 
countries may be as beneficial as granting them preferential market access and that the negative 
effects of preference erosion can be offset by providing preferred developing countries with the 
financial and in-kind resources needed to improve the relative market competitiveness of their 
bananas by enhancing their technical efficiency in production and their logistic infrastructures.   20
Nevertheless, the results presented in this paper confirm the importance of the benefits to be 
accrued by ACP countries on the banana market from the implementation of the EPA (at the 
expense of MFN exporters) and provide quantitative evidence on the effects of the preference 




Alexandraki K. and H. P. Lankes (2004). The Impact of Preference Erosion on Middle-Income 
Developing Countries. IMF Working Paper. WP/04/169. September. 
Anania, G. (2006). The 2005 WTO arbitration and the new EU import regime for bananas: a cut 
too far?. European Review of Agricultural Economics. 33(4):449-484. 
Anania G. (2008). The 2006 Reform of the EU Domestic Policy Regime for Bananas. An 
Assessment of its Impact on Trade. Journal of International Agricultural Trade and 
Development. (4) 2, forthcoming. 
Arias, P., Hallam D., Hubbard L. And Liu P. (2005). The elusive tariff equivalent for the EU 
banana market. Commodity Market Review 2005-2006:107-124. 
Bouët A., J.-C. Bureau, Y. Decreux and S. Jean (2005). Multilateral Agricultural Trade 
Liberalization : The Contrasting Fortunes of Developing Countries in the Doha Round. The 
World Economy. (28) 9: 1329-1354. 
Bouët A., L. Fontagné and S. Jean (2006). Is Erosion of Tariff Preferences a Serious Concern? In 
K. Anderson and W. Martin (eds) Agricultural Trade Reform & the Doha Development 
Agenda. Palgrave Macmillan & World Bank: 161-192.  
Bureau J.-C., A.-C. Disdier and P. Ramos (2007). A Comparison of the Barriers Faced by Latin 
American and ACP Countries’ Exports of Tropical Products. ICTSD (International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development) Issue Paper No. 9, Geneva, June. 
Candau F. and S. Jean (2005). What Are EU Trade Preferences Worth for Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Other Developing Countries ?CEPII Working Paper No 2005/19. December. 
EC (2006). Council Regulation amending Regulations (EEC) No 404/93, (EC) No 1782/2003 
and (EC) No 247/2006 as regards the banana sector. Reg. No 1782/2006, 19 December. 
EC (2007). Council Regulation applying the arrangements for products originating in certain 
states which are part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States 
provided for in agreements establishing, or leading to the establishment of, Economic 
Partnership Agreements. Reg. No 1528/2007, 20 December.   21
Gallezot J. and J.-C. Bureau (2004). The utilization of trade preferences by OECD countries: the 
case of agricultural and food products entering the European Union and United States. 
Paris: OECD. 
Goodison P. (2007). The ACP Experience of Preference Erosion in the Banana and Sugar 
Sectors. ICTSD (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development) Issue Paper 
No. 7, Geneva, June. 
Guyomard, H., Laroche, C. and Le Mouël C. (1999a). An economic assessment of the Common 
Market Organization for bananas in the European Union. Agricultural Economics 20: 105-
120. 
Guyomard, H., Laroche, C. and Le Mouël C. (1999b). Impacts of the Common Market 
Organization for Bananas on the European Union Markets, International Trade, and 
Welfare.  Journal of Policy Modeling 21: 619-631. 
Guyomard, H. and Le Mouël, C. (2003). The New Banana Import regime in the European 
Union: A Quantitative Assessment. The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and 
Trade Policy 4: 143-161. 
Guyomard, H., Le Mouël, C., and Levert, F. (2006). The tariff-only import regime for bananas in 
the European Union: setting the tariff at right level is impossible mission. paper presented 
at the 26
th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists, , Gold 
Coast (Australia), August. 
ICTSD. (2008). Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest. (12), 16, 9 May. 
Josling, T. E. (2003). Bananas and the WTO: Testing the New Dispute Settlement Process. In 
Josling, T. E. and Taylor, T. G. (eds). Banana Wars. The Anatomy of a Trade Dispute. 
Wallingford: CABI Publishing: 169-194. 
Kersten, L. (1995). Impacts of the EU banana market regulation on international competition, 
trade and welfare. European Review of Agricultural Economics. 22(3): 321-335. 
Lippoldt D. and P. Kowalski (2005). Trade Preference Erosion: Potential Economic Impacts. 
OECD Trade Policy Working Papers No 17. TD/TC/WP(2004)30/FINAL. OECD 
Publishing. 26 April. 
Low P., R. Piermartini and J. Richtering (2006). Non-Reciprocal Preference Erosion Arising 
From MFN Liberalization in Agriculture: What are the Risks? WTO Economic Research 
and Statistics Division. Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-02. March. 
Manchin M. (2006). Preference Utilisation and Tariff Reduction in EU Imports from ACP 
Countries. The World Economy. (29): 1243-1266. 
Panagariya A. (2002). EU Preferential Trade Arrangements and Developing Countries. The 
World Economy. (25) 10: 1415-1432.   22
Read, R. (2001). The Anatomy of the EU-US WTO Banana Trade Dispute. The Estey Centre 
Journal of International Law and Trade Policy (2) 2: 257-282. 
Samuelson P. A. (1952). Spatial Price Equilibrium and Linear Programming. American 
Economic Review. (42): 283-303. 
Spreen, T.H., Paggi, M., Flambert, A.and Jauregui C. (2004). Implications of Changes in the EU 
Banana Trade Regime on World Banana Trade. Food and Resource Economics 
Department, University of Florida, mimeo. 
Takayama T. and G. G. Judge (1971). Spatial and Temporal Price and Allocation Models, 
Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Tangermann S. (2002). The future of preferential trade arrangements for developing countries 
and the current round of WTO negotiations on agriculture. Rome: FAO. 
Tangermann, S. (2003a). European Interests in the Banana Market. In Josling, T. E. and Taylor, 
T. G. (eds), Banana Wars. The Anatomy of a Trade Dispute. Wallingford: CABI 
Publishing: 17-44. 
Tangermann, S. (2003b). The European Common Banana Policy. In Josling, T. E. and Taylor, T. 
G. (eds), Banana Wars. The Anatomy of a Trade Dispute. Wallingford: CABI Publishing: 
45-66. 
Thagesen, R. and Matthews, A. (1997). The EU’s Common Banana Regime: An Initial 
Evaluation. Journal of Common Market Studies 35: 615-627. 
Vanzetti, D., Fernandez de Cordoba, S. and Chau V. (2005). Banana Split. How EU Policies 
Divide Global Producers. UNCTAD, Policy Issues in International Trade and 
Commodities Study Series No. 31. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
Yang Y. (2005). Africa in the Doha Round: Dealing with Preference Erosion and Beyond. IMF 
Policy Discussion Paper PDP/05/08. November. 
Yamazaki F. (1996). Potential erosion of trade preferences in agricultural products. Food Policy. 
(21) 4/5: 409-417. 
Yu W. and T. V. Jensen (2005). Tariff Preferences, WTO Negotiations and the LDCs: The Case 
of the “Everything But Arms” Initiative. The World Economy. (28) 3: 375-405. 
Wainio J. and P. Gibson. The Significance of US Nonreciprocal Trade Preferences for 
Developing Countries. In G. Anania, M. Bohman, C. Carter and A. McCalla (eds). 
Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO. Where Are We Heading? Cheltenham:Edward 
Elgar: 369-389. 
World Bank. (various years). World Development Report, The World Bank, Washington DC. 
WTO. (2004). Doha Work Programme. Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 
2004, WT/L/579, 2 August.   23
WTO. (2007). Draft Modalities for Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture, Special session, 
JOB(07)128, 17 July. 
WTO. (2008a). Tiered Formula for Tariff Reductions, Working Document No. 9, Committee on 
Agriculture, Special session, January. 
WTO. (2008b). Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture, Special 
session, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2, 19 May. 
   24
Figure 1 -    EU-27 banana imports (in total and by origin) as a function of the MFN tariff (2013; 
EPA in place, no DDA round agreement). 
 









   from ACP     from MFN
   from ACP 1,459 1,368 1,28 1,193 1,105 1,017 0,929 0,842
    from MFN 2,987 3,184 3,372 3,561 3,75 3,94 4,129 4,318





    25 



















































EU-15 4103,9 4364,7 6,4 703,1 -0,50 0,5 0,4 1,19
EU-10 209,3 221,4 5,8 773,4 -0,75 0,9 -0,2 4,27
Bulgaria and Romania 49,4 47,7 -3,4 611,2 -0,80 1,0 -0,7 7,28
USA 3881,6 3858,2 -0,6 411,6 -0,40 0,4 1,79 1,0 1,85
Rest of the world net importers 4790,8 4728,6 -1,3 533,2 -0,80 0,5 3,25 0,8 3,46
Spain 384,0 384,0 0,0 957,5 1,0 0,04
France 308,5 308,5 0,0 607,0 1,0 0,00
Portugal 18,8 18,8 0,0 757,3 1,0 0,00
Greece 2,8 2,8 0,0 667,8 1,0 0,00
Cyprus 8,9 9,0 1,1 485,6 1,0 2,42
Ivory Coast 196,6 176,8 -10,1 565,6 1,5 0,5 5,00 1,6 -1,98
Cameroon 245,8 256,1 4,2 416,0 1,5 0,5 0,00 1,9 1,94
Dominican Republic 152,9 146,8 -4,0 518,5 1,0 0,5 5,00 1,5 0,60
Belize and Suriname 111,0 105,1 -5,3 493,8 1,0 0,5 1,87 1,6 0,63
Other ACP non LDC 59,6 57,1 -4,2 467,1 1,0 0,5 4,77 1,7 2,62
ACP LDC 8,1 8,1 0,0 369,9 1,0 0,5 0,00 2,3 3,10
Ecuador 4084,8 4209,2 3,0 308,5 1,3 0,5 1,95 1,5 3,69
Colombia 1379,4 1364,2 -1,1 328,5 1,3 0,5 0,00 1,6 1,94
Costa Rica 1589,7 1659,0 4,4 321,7 1,0 0,5 1,65 1,9 2,15
Panama 322,5 332,2 3,0 345,3 1,0 0,5 0,00 1,8 2,58
Honduras 468,0 477,6 2,1 301,6 1,5 0,5 0,00 2,3 1,30
Brazil 211,9 212,7 0,4 244,8 1,0 0,5 1,58 1,4 0,80
Guatemala 1121,6 1112,3 -0,8 267,2 1,5 0,5 5,00 2,4 0,10
Other MFN exporters non LDC 2305,5 2317,7 0,5 363,8 1,0 0,5 1,18 1,5 1,07
LDC non-ACP exporters 60,9 62,5 2,6 249,0 1,0 0,5 0,00 2,1 3,49
5:  For Belize and Suriname this is the 2004/2005 annual rate of change due to lack of data for the period 2000/2005.
1:  For EU-15 and EU-10 apparent consumption (imports + domestic production - exports). 
2:  For Spain, France, Portugal and Greece average production in 2002-2006. 
3:   For Spain, France, Portugal and Greece official farm gate prices, including compensatory aid; for Cyprus it is the official farm gate price. The average unit value of exports of Panama from FAO was unrealistacally high 
compared with values for other countries in the region and average unit values based on the COMTRADE database; it has been adjusted based on the differences in average unit values for exports of countries in the 
region calculated using COMTRADE.
4:  Percentage changes below 0 and above 5 have been set equal to 0 and 5, respectively. 
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all t = 0     
tariff reduction   
-66% and EU 
bound          
t = 680 €/t
tariff reduction  
-66% and EU 
bound          
t = 176 €/t 
EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=110 €/t EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=79.2 €/t EU tMFN= 0 €/t EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=59.8 €/t
US t=0.5% US t=0.5% US t=0.3% US t=0.3% US t=0% US t=0.2% US t=0.2%
ROW t=18.9% ROW t=18.9% ROW t=9.8% ROW t=9.8% ROW t=0% ROW t=6.4% ROW t=6.4%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
EU-27 consumption (000 t) 4992,4 5025,2 5289,1 5008,9 5395,5 5692,8 5002,6 5466,6
EU-27 production (000 t) 578,9 578,6 575,8 578,8 574,6 569,9 578,8 573,9
EU-15 border price (€/t, tariff inclusive) 517,8 510,3 450,3 514,0 426,2 358,6 515,5 410,0
EU-27 imports (000 t) 4413,4 4446,6 4713,4 4430,1 4820,9 5122,9 4423,8 4892,7
     from non-LDC ACP countries 808,5 1459,2 1227,7 1473,6 1134,3 873,4 1479,1 1071,9
     from non-LDC MFN countries 3605,0 2987,4 3485,7 2956,5 3686,6 4249,5 2944,7 3820,8
     from LDC countries 00 0 0 000 0
EU-27 tariff revenue (mill €) 640,4 525,8 383,4 520,3 292,0 0 518,3 228,5
USA imports (000 t) 4227,3 4276,0 4236,7 4255,7 4197,5 4127,9 4248,4 4178,3
Rest of the world net imports (000 t) 4452,6 4550,9 4471,5 4836,5 4727,7 4968,6 4944,7 4817,7
ACP countries, total exports (000 t) 808,5 1459,2 1227,7 1473,6 1134,3 873,4 1479,1 1071,9
ACP countries, export revenue (mill $)
1 314,9 937,7 678,4 955,1 585,6 362,3 961,8 527,4
MFN countries, total exports (000 t) 12284,8 11814,3 12193,9 12048,6 12611,8 13346,0 12137,9 12816,8
MFN countries, export revenue (mill $) 4427,5 4127,7 4368,8 4275,7 4624,2 5142,5 4332,8 4779,3
LDC countries, total exports (000 t) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1: in the "Base 2013" scenarios it does not include quota rents.
Table 2  -  Simulation results (2013).
Base 2013  
(no EPA, no 
DDA)







agreement:      
t = 110 €/t
EU bound      
t = 680 €/t and 
EU tariff 
reduction       
-66%  
EU bound      
t = 176 €/t and 
EU tariff 
reduction      
-55%
Bananas included among "tropical products"
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all t = 0     
tariff reduction   
-66% and EU 
bound          
t = 680 €/t
tariff reduction  
-66% and EU 
bound          
t = 176 €/t 
EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=110 €/t EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=79.2 €/t EU tMFN= 0 €/t EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=59.8 €/t
US t=0.5% US t=0.5% US t=0.3% US t=0.3% US t=0% US t=0.2% US t=0.2%
ROW t=18.9% ROW t=18.9% ROW t=9.8% ROW t=9.8% ROW t=0% ROW t=6.4% ROW t=6.4%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
EU-27 consumption (000 t) 5164,9 5197,9 5463,4 5183,4 5572,2 5873,4 5177,8 5636,2
EU-27 production (000 t) 577,8 577,4 574,6 577,6 571,9 568,0 577,6 571,1
EU-15 border price (€/t, tariff inclusive) 479,3 471,8 411,5 475,1 386,8 318,3 476,4 372,2
EU-27 imports (000 t) 4587,2 4620,5 4888,8 4605,8 5000,3 5305,5 4600,2 5065,1
     from non-LDC ACP countries 816,2 1553,6 1289,6 1568,0 1181,3 881,8 1573,5 1117,7
     from non-LDC MFN countries 3770,9 3067,0 3599,2 3037,8 3819,0 4423,7 3026,7 3947,4
     from LDC countries 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
EU-27 tariff revenue (mill €) 670,9 539,8 395,9 534,6 302,5 0,0 532,7 236,1
USA imports (000 t) 4214,2 4269,7 4227,7 4249,2 4186,9 4113,9 4241,9 4153,1
Rest of the world net imports (000 t) 4426,1 4538,3 4453,5 4824,4 4708,0 4944,6 4932,9 4771,9
ACP countries, total exports (000 t) 816,2 1553,6 1289,6 1568,0 1181,3 881,8 1573,5 1117,7
ACP countries, export revenue (mill $)
1 320,4 1055,3 743,6 1073,9 631,5 368,6 1081,0 569,8
MFN countries, total exports (000 t) 12411,1 11874,5 12280,4 12111,1 12713,9 13482,2 12201,4 12872,3
MFN countries, export revenue (mill $) 4509,9 4165,7 4424,7 4315,8 4710,2 5238,2 4373,6 4883,0
LDC countries, total exports (000 t) 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
1: in the "Base 2013" scenarios does not include quota rents.
Table 3  -  Sensitivity analysis, euro/US dollar exchange rate equal 1.7 (instead of 1.5).
Bananas included among "tropical products" Base 2013  
(no EPA, no 
DDA)
EPA






agreement:      
t = 110 €/t
EU bound      
t = 680 €/t and 
EU tariff 
reduction       
-66%  
EU bound      
t = 176 €/t and 
EU tariff 
reduction      
-55%  28 
all t = 0     
tariff reduction   
-66% and EU 
bound          
t = 680 €/t
tariff reduction  
-66% and EU 
bound          
t = 176 €/t 
EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=110 €/t EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=79.2 €/t EU tMFN= 0 €/t EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=59.8 €/t
US t=0.5% US t=0.5% US t=0.3% US t=0.3% US t=0% US t=0.2% US t=0.2%
ROW t=18.9% ROW t=18.9% ROW t=9.8% ROW t=9.8% ROW t=0% ROW t=6.4% ROW t=6.4%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
EU-27 consumption (000 t) 4769,7 4802,3 5064,3 4783,7 5167,4 5459,8 4776,6 5237,0
EU-27 production (000 t) 580,5 580,1 577,3 580,3 576,2 573,1 580,4 575,5
EU-15 border price (€/t, tariff inclusive) 567,4 560,0 500,4 564,2 477,0 410,5 565,8 461,2
EU-27 imports (000 t) 4189,3 4222,2 4487,0 4203,4 4591,2 4886,7 4196,2 4661,6
     from non-LDC ACP countries 798,5 1362,7 1163,5 1376,8 1085,0 862,7 1382,2 1032,1
     from non-LDC MFN countries 3390,8 2859,5 3323,5 2826,5 3506,2 4024,1 2814,0 3629,5
     from LDC countries 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
EU-27 tariff revenue (mill €) 600,9 503,3 365,6 497,5 277,7 0,0 495,3 217,0
USA imports (000 t) 4244,1 4286,1 4249,4 4266,0 4211,8 4146,1 4258,9 4193,6
Rest of the world net imports (000 t) 4486,7 4571,3 4497,4 4855,8 4754,6 4999,6 4963,7 4845,4
ACP countries, total exports (000 t) 798,5 1362,7 1163,5 1376,8 1085,0 862,7 1382,2 1032,1
ACP countries, export revenue (mill $)
1 308 824,5 613,9 840,6 539,4 354,2 846,8 491,8
MFN countries, total exports (000 t) 12121,6 11716,9 12070,3 11948,4 12472,3 13169,7 12036,6 12668,6
MFN countries, export revenue (mill $) 4322,3 4066,9 4289,6 4212,1 4550,2 5020,1 4268,0 4679,9
LDC countries, total exports (000 t) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
LDC countries, export revenue (mill $) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
1: in the "Base 2013" scenarios does not include quota rents.
Bananas included among "tropical products"
Table 4  -  Sensitivity analysis, euro/US dollar exchange rate equal 1.3 (instead of 1.5).
Base 2013  
(no EPA, no 
DDA)
EPA






agreement:      
t = 110 €/t
EU bound      
t = 680 €/t and 
EU tariff 
reduction       
-66%  
EU bound      
t = 176 €/t and 
EU tariff 
reduction      
-55%  29 
all t = 0     
tariff reduction   
-66% and EU 
bound          
t = 680 €/t
tariff reduction  
-66% and EU 
bound          
t = 176 €/t 
EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=110 €/t EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=79.2 €/t EU tMFN= 0 €/t EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=59.8 €/t
US t=0.5% US t=0.5% US t=0.3% US t=0.3% US t=0% US t=0.2% US t=0.2%
ROW t=18.9% ROW t=18.9% ROW t=9.8% ROW t=9.8% ROW t=0% ROW t=6.4% ROW t=6.4%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
EU-27 consumption (000 t) 4994,5 5022,8 5289,1 5008,9 5395,4 5694,6 5000,0 5466,9
EU-27 production (000 t) 578,9 578,6 575,8 578,8 574,6 569,9 578,9 573,9
EU-15 border price (€/t, tariff inclusive) 517,3 510,9 450,3 514,0 426,2 358,2 516,0 409,9
EU-27 imports (000 t) 4415,6 4444,2 4713,4 4430,1 4820,8 5124,7 4421,1 4893,0
     from non-LDC ACP countries 851,3 1410,9 1227,7 1473,6 1131,4 907,1 1427,9 1077,8
     from non-LDC MFN countries 3564,4 3033,3 3485,7 2956,5 3689,3 4217,6 2993,2 3815,2
     from LDC countries 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
EU-27 tariff revenue (mill €) 640,8 533,9 383,4 520,3 292,2 0,0 526,8 228,1
USA imports (000 t) 4230,5 4272,3 4236,7 4255,7 4197,3 4130,5 4244,5 4178,8
Rest of the world net imports (000 t) 4459 4543,6 4471,5 4836,5 4727,3 4973,0 4937,7 4818,5
ACP countries, total exports (000 t) 851,3 1410,9 1227,7 1473,6 1131,4 907,1 1427,9 1077,8
ACP countries, export revenue (mill $)
1 332,0 907,5 678,4 955,1 584,5 376,6 929,5 530,7
MFN countries, total exports (000 t) 12253,8 11849,3 12193,9 12048,6 12613,9 13321,,1 1217,5 12812,5
MFN countries, export revenue (mill $) 4407,5 4149,6 4368,8 4275,7 4643,5 5125,1 4356,9 4776,4
LDC countries, total exports (000 t) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
1: in the "Base 2013" scenarios does not include quota rents.
Table 5  -  Sensitivity analysis, Cameroon and Ivory Coast export supply price elasticity equal 1 (instead of 1.5).
Base 2013  
(no EPA, no 
DDA)
EPA






agreement:      
t = 110 €/t
EU bound      
t = 680 €/t and 
EU tariff 
reduction       
-66%  
EU bound      
t = 176 €/t and 
EU tariff 
reduction      
-55%
Bananas included among "tropical products"  30 
all t = 0     
tariff reduction   
-66% and EU 
bound          
t = 680 €/t
tariff reduction  
-66% and EU 
bound          
t = 176 €/t 
EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=110 €/t EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=79.2 €/t EU tMFN= 0 €/t EU tMFN=176 €/t EU tMFN=59.8 €/t
US t=0.5% US t=0.5% US t=0.3% US t=0.3% US t=0% US t=0.2% US t=0.2%
ROW t=18.9% ROW t=18.9% ROW t=9.8% ROW t=9.8% ROW t=0% ROW t=6.4% ROW t=6.4%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
EU-27 consumption (000 t) 4920,3 4925,9 5194,5 4904,2 5297,7 5594,4 4895,9 5368,0
EU-27 production (000 t) 579,5 579,5 576,6 579,7 575,5 571,1 579,8 574,8
EU-15 border price (€/t, tariff inclusive) 534,2 532,9 471,9 537,8 448,4 381,0 539,7 432,4
EU-27 imports (000 t) 4340,8 4346,4 4617,8 4324,5 4722,1 5023,3 4316,1 4793,2
     from non-LDC ACP countries 775,0 885,6 745,0 896,9 691,0 535,7 901,3 654,2
     from non-LDC MFN countries 3565,8 3460,9 3872,8 3427,6 4031,1 4487,6 3414,8 4139,0
     from LDC countries 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
EU-27 tariff revenue (mill €) 627,6 609,1 426,0 603,3 316,3 0,0 601,0 247,5
USA imports (000 t) 4120,3 4128,5 4096,1 4100,6 4052,5 3982,6 4090,5 4032,4
Rest of the world net imports (000 t) 5175,8 5196,2 5116,1 5554,8 5444,9 5767,1 5691,2 5562,7
ACP countries, total exports (000 t) 775,0 885,6 745,0 896,9 691,0 535,7 901,3 654,2
ACP countries, export revenue (mill $)
1 473,6 604,8 440,7 619,2 384,5 244,1 624,7 348,4
MFN countries, total exports (000 t) 12861,9 12785,6 13085,1 13082,9 13528,4 14237,4 13196,6 13734,1
MFN countries, export revenue (mill $) 4969,1 4915,6 5127,2 5125,7 5448,6 5982,8 5207,1 5601,1
LDC countries, total exports (000 t) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
1: in the "Base 2013" scenarios does not include quota rents.
Table 6  -  Sensitivity analysis, percent per year yield increases not to exceed 2%.
Base 2013  
(no EPA, no 
DDA)
EPA






agreement:      
t = 110 €/t
EU bound      
t = 680 €/t and 
EU tariff 
reduction       
-66%  
EU bound      
t = 176 €/t and 
EU tariff 
reduction      
-55%
Bananas included among "tropical products"
 